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This issue was preserved in a pre-trial motion and at a
suppression hearing (R. 22-39, 57-74).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath and affirmation
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Stuart Earl Johnson appeals from the judgment, sentence and

order of Probation and a year in the Utah County Jail by the
Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Fourth District Court, on December
10, 1997, after the denial of Johnson's Motion to Suppress
Evidence and the entry of a conditional plea to Possession of
Marijuana in a Drug Free Zone, a Third Degree Felony.
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B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Johnson was charged by information filed on or about

November 22, 1996, with two violations of the controlled
substances act (R. 2).
After a preliminary hearing (R. 11) and the entry of "not
guilty" pleas at arraignment (R. 16), Johnson filed a Motion to
Suppress the Evidence under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 2239).

Johnson argued that the warrantless search of the house

wherein he was found was without his consent and was not
justified by "exigent circumstances" (Id.).
On July 1, 1997, a suppression hearing was conducted before
Judge Burningham and the trial court subsequently denied
Johnson's Motion to Suppress (R. 48-49, 57-74).
Johnson entered a conditional plea of "guilty" to Possession
of Marijuana in a Drug Free Zone, a third degree felony and he
was sentenced to thirty-six months probation and 14 days in the
Utah County Jail Work Diversion Program (R. 99-104, 119-20).

On

February 5, 1998, Johnson filed a Stipulated Motion to Extend
Time to Appeal; and he subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal with
the Fourth District Court on February 6, 1998, challenging the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress(R. 115-117, 12526) .

3

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On November 16, 1996 Provo City police officers were
dispatched to 980 North 646 West in Provo because a neighbor was
complaining about an odor of marijuana coming from the downstairs
apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 5-6).1

The building was either a four-

plex or duplex with upstairs and downstairs apartments with
shared walls (Supp. Hrg. at 15).
Officers Eric Knudsen and Trent Halladay arrived at the
apartment complex at approximately 11:30 p.m. and spoke with the
complainants, Troy Guevara and Jason Campbell, just outside the
apartment complex (Supp. Hrg. at 6-7, 22).

Guevara and Campbell

again indicated to the officers that they could detect an odor of
burnt marijuana coming from the downstairs apartment and that
they didn't believe the renter or owner of the apartment was
present and that they didn't know or recognize any of the people
in the apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 7, 22, 29). Knudsen did not ask
the complainants about their knowledge of the apartments
owner/occupants (Supp. Hrg. at 17).
Present with Guevara and Campbell, according to Knudsen, was
J.C. Thomas Anderson, whom Guevara and Campbell said had been in
the apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 7-8). Officer Eric Knudsen "spoke
with [Anderson] briefly for a second" and was told upon

*The transcript of the suppression hearing is found at R.
57-74.
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questioning that Anderson did not live in the downstairs
apartment but was just visiting (Supp. Hrg. at 8 ) . Knudsen did
not make inquiry with Anderson as to the apartment's owner (Supp,
Hrg. at 16). Knudsen did not personally know if Anderson had
been in the downstairs apartment (Id.).

Halliday could not

recall participating in any conversation with Anderson (Supp.
Hrg. at 29).
Knudsen then looked down the stairwell to the downstairs
apartment and "saw the door was slightly open" (Supp. Hrg. at 8 ) .
As Knudsen then walked down the stairs, someone from the inside
shut the door (Supp. Hrg. at 9 ) . At this point Knudsen could not
detect any noticeable odors (although on cross-examination he
indicated he could smell marijuana coming from Anderson) (Supp.
Hrg. at 9, 17). Halliday also indicated that he only smelled
marijuana "when we approached the house" and after the door was
opened (Supp. Hrg. at 28) .
Knudsen knocked several times on the door with no answer
although he could hear "rustling around" (Supp. Hrg. at 9, 12,
20).

Knudsen then checked the door handle to see if it was

locked and finding it unlocked he opened the door approximately a
few feet (Supp. Hrg. at 9-10).

Knudsen did not have permission

to enter the apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 19). 2

2

Halliday testified that he and Knudsen went down the
stairwell and knocked on the door which was opened by a young man
(Supp. Hrg. at 23). Halliday testified he was behind Knudsen

5

Knudsen testified that the room appeared dark from where he
stood in the doorway; and that he did not advance any further
into the home but simply announced his identity and that he
wished to speak with an occupant (Supp. Hrg. at 10).

Knudsen

(and Halliday) testified that "immediately after opening" the
door he could smell an odor of marijuana (Supp. Hrg. at 10, 24) .
The officers testified that they saw no weapons or people in the
apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 20, 31) .
Upon opening the door and identifying himself, Knudsen (and
Halliday) were informed by another officer that some individuals
were running from the back of the building and that officer then
gave foot pursuit (Supp. Hrg. at 10, 19-20, 30) .
Eventually Knudsen left the apartment and apprehended two
individuals (Supp. Hrg. at 10). Approximately 7-8 individuals
were apprehended by the two officers (Supp. Hrg. at 11, 24).
These individuals "were all brought back to the outside of the
apartment and sat down on the north curb" (Supp. Hrg. at 11).
When asked the individuals informed the officers that none of
them lived in the downstairs apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 11, 24).
In addition, the individuals either did not know—or would not
tell—who owned the apartment (Id.).

Approximately fifteen

minutes elapsed between the time Knudsen entered the apartment

(Id.). Halliday testified that Knudsen asked the individual
whose apartment it was and "the gentleman couldn't give us an
answer" (Supp. Hrg. at 24).
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and the officers questioning of the individuals (Id.).
Knudsen then had officers John (or Juanda) and Halliday
search the apartment because he "couldn't find out who the owner
was [and he] wasn't sure if there was still someone in the
apartment" (Supp. Hrg. at 12). Knudsen said he did this out of
concern for "officer safety" (Id.)-

Knudsen testified he was

concerned with a possible burglary/trespass upon speaking with
the complainants (Supp. Hrg. at 12,33), however, Halliday
testified that he did not suspect a trespass until the
individuals were apprehended and questioned (Supp. Hrg. at 30,
32) .
Halliday and John searched the apartment and located Johnson
locked in a bathroom (Supp. Hrg. at 25).

In addition, a

marijuana bong was discovered in a bedroom (Id). The officers
then took Johnson outside and Knudsen then left and obtained a
search warrant and executed it on the premises (Supp. Hrg. at 21,
26).

During the execution of the warrant, the officers located

marijuana in the apartment.
After the denial of Johnson's motion to suppress, he
subsequently entered a conditional plea of "guilty" to Possession
of marijuana in a Drug Free Zone with a prior conviction, a Third
Degree Felony; and he was sentenced to three years probation and
14 days in the Utah County Jail Work Diversion Program.
In a supplemental report filed with the Utah County
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Attorney's office, Knudsen attached a note to the prosecutor
which said: "Sorry for the confusion on the report.
involved in this case as much as I should have been.

I was not
Other

officers were assisting also and therefore some of the decisions
made may have been questionable" (Supp. Hrg. at 34-35).

However,

Knudsen clarified on redirect examination that the confusion only
involved individuals at the scene (Supp. Hrg. at 36).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Warrantless searches of homes are violative of Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution unless conducted pursuant to a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

In this case,

the trial court concluded that the warrantless searches of
Johnson's residence were justified under an "exigent
circumstances" theory.

Johnson asserts that the trial court's

decision is erroneous because no exigent circumstances were
present at the time of the officer opening the door to the
private residence nor at the time the warrantless "security
sweep" search was made.

It was necessary for the protection of

the police or the preservation of the evidence or to prevent the
escape of suspects.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF JOHNSON'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HISRESIDENCE WAS REASONABLE
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, particularly
in one's home.

Indeed, " x[p]hysical entry of the home is the

chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed. * "

State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13, (Utah App. 1993)

(quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313, (1972)).

Moreover, "warrantless searches and seizures

within a home or other private premises are per se unreasonable
absent exigent circumstances,"

Beavers, 859 P.2d at 13.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, (1967);

(citing

and "there

must be a showing by those who seek the exemption ...

that the

exigencies of the situation made [the search] imperative."

State

v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).

Furthermore, "[t]he State

bears the particulary heavy burden of proving the warrantless
entry into a home falls within the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement."

Beavers, 859 P.2d at 13.

In the present case, law enforcement officers opened the
door to Johnsons' residence absent consent and ordered that

9

someone come to the door to respond to questioning (Supp. Hrg. at
9-10, 19). A

warrantless "security sweep" of Johnson's home was

subsequently conducted for expressed officer safety reasons, at
which time the incriminating material was observed (Supp. Hrg. at
12, 25). Clearly these actions are subject to Fourth Amendment
protections.
Johnson asserts that the trial court erred in concluding
that the State had sustained its burden of establishing that the
circumstances surrounding these searches of Johnson's residence
constitute an exception to the warrant requirement under an
"exigent circumstances" theory and that the officers had probable
cause and reasonable suspicion (R. 79-81).

Johnson particularly

challenges the trial court's conclusion that the warrantless
"security sweep" of the apartment, which resulted in the
discovery of the marijuana and which was conducted long-after the
other suspects had been apprehended—was justified.
A.
The warrantless search of Johnson's residence was not
justified by "exigent circumstances.
A warrantless search or seizure within a residence is
"constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent
circumstances are proven."
(Utah App. 1997).

State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540

Such an exception exists to prevent physical

harm to law enforcement personnel or others, the destruction of
evidence, or the escape of the suspect.

Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540

(citing Beavers, 859 P.2d at 13). However, "exigent
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circumstances exist ^only when the inevitable delay incident to
obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate
action.' "

Wells, 928 P.2d at 389 (citation omitted) (quoting

United States v. Satterfield. 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir.
1984) ) .
In Beavers, 859 P.2d at 9, this Court concluded that
"[e]xigent circumstances are those *that would cause a reasonable
person to believe that entry. . .

was necessary to prevent

physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction
of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement
efforts."

(citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199

(9th Cir. 1984), cert,

denied,

469 U.S. 824 (1984)).

However,

"the mere possibility that a suspect may have a weapon or that
evidence might be destroyed in insufficient."
389 (citations omitted).

Wells, 928 P.2d at

Additionally, "[a]ny legitimate concern

which police claim for their safety must of necessity arise
before the challenged entry," and "police cannot create the
exigency in order to justify a warrantless entry."

Beaversf at

18 (citing "United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 297, 297-98
(5th Cir. 1986)(where agents knew that their knocking would
create a need for a security search, exigent circumstances were
of their own making and the search was improper)").
The facts of the Beavers case are particularly relevant
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here, where the operation of the same exception is at issue.

In

Beavers, officers responded to a call from the manager of an
apartment regarding a possible assault in progress.

Upon arrival

to the scene, the manager added that he had seen two males enter
the suspect apartment earlier, but that he did not believe that
the renter was home.

Beavers, 859 P.2d at 10.

The officers

reportedly could hear raised voices coming from within the
apartment, and they further noted that the door latch had been
broken and that the door was slightly opened.

Id.

The officers

positioned themselves outside the apartment and listened to the
progressing argument, which appeared to involve the value of
coats.

Id. at 11.

The facts of the case further indicate that a

large number of coats had been stolen from area stores earlier
that day.

Id. at 10.

Moments later, one of the individuals inside the apartment
attempted to leave and stepped through the doorway out into the
hall carrying a new coat.

Upon seeing the officers, the suspect

stepped back across the threshold into the apartment.

One

officer reached through the open doorway to grab the suspect
before he could retreat further.

Id. at 11.

At that point the

officers observed several other individuals within the room.
the information received from the manager indicated that the
renter was Caucasian and the suspects were clearly AfricanAmerican, the officers did not believe that the renter was

12

As

present.

Id.

The officers further observed one of the suspects

fumbling in a pile of clothes while the others fled from view.
In light of the facts known to them and out of an additional
concern for officer safety, the officers drew their weapons and
proceeded to enter the apartment and seize all individuals
present within.

Beavers, 859 P.2d at 11.

Upon searching the

apartment, the coats which had been taken earlier in the day were
located and recovered.

The Defendant appealed his ensuing

convictions of burglary and theft.

Id. at 10.

Upon consideration of the warrantless search in Beavers,
this Court reversed the defendant's conviction at trial.

The

Court weighed all information available to the officers at the
time the warrantless entry was made, including: the tip from the
manager of a crime (assualt) in progress, the information that
the manager did not believe that the Caucasian renter of the
suspect apartment was home and the later confirmation that all
occupants were in fact African American, the fact that the latch
to the apartment door was broken from a possible forced entry,
the knowledge that a burglary and theft involving coats had been
committed earlier that day, the argument the officers overheard
regarding the value of coats, and the fears the officers had
regarding their own safety.

Taking all those factors into

consideration, the Court nevertheless delined to uphold the
warrantless search, stating: "[T]he undisputed factual findings
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indicate that Officer Humphries reached accross the threshold of
apartment 4B to seize the retreating Davis.

Thus, the seizure

occurred within the constitutionally protected confines of a
private residence, where citizens enjoy a heightened expectation
of privacy."

Beavers, 859 P. 2d at 13.

The facts of Beavers closely parallel the facts of the
present case.

In both situations, law enforcement personnel

responded to calls from residents in apartment buildings
regarding suspected criminal activity in progress within those
buildings.

In both cases the officers noted some suspicious

activity at the scene.

In Beavers, the officers observed a

broken door latch, indicating a possible break-in, and they
overheard an argument over the value of coats which were
suspected to be stolen property.

In the present case, Officer

Knutzen noted an individual outside the suspect apartment who
smelled of burnt marijuana (Supp. Hrg. at 17). This person was
not believed to be a resident of the home (Supp. Hrg. at 8 ) . In
both cases, the informants relayed to law enforcement officers
that the renter of the respective apartment was not believed to
be home (Supp. Hrg. at 7, 22, 29).

Finally, in both cases the

officers eventually entered the apartments, using their
suspicions of criminal activity and officer safety concerns to
support their entry (Supp. Hrg. at 12, 33). Johnson asserts that
the present action is so similar to Beavers that the same result

14

should be reached—namely that the actions of law enforcement
officers should be held in violation of his constitutional
rights.
In a related case, State v. Wells, 928 P.2d at 389 (citation
omitted) this Court concluded that the trial court erred in
failing to suppress cocaine which was found in the lining of
defendant's jacket after officers had executed arrest warrants on
the defendant and handcuffed both suspects at the home.

In its

decision this Court noted "[t]he record reflects that both
suspects were handcuffed and in custody when the cocaine was
seized...

The officers had controlled the initially chaotic

situation by the time they searched the jacket.

Therefore, the

initial exigencies which had dissipated by the time of the
search, could not have justified the cocaine seizure."

Id. at

389.
Similar to the situation in Wells the record in this case
reflects that the officers had controlled any initially chaotic
situation when they apprehended the seven individuals who fled
from the apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 11, 24). They were secured
safely outside the apartment and the officers had observed no
furtive movements or weapons of any kind.

Therefore any "initial

exigencies" had dissipated by the time of the warrantless
"security sweep" and could not have justified the warrantless
search.

15

Using the first prong of the test outlined in Beavers , the
trial court determined that the search in question was justified
based on exigent circumstances.

In support of its decision the

trial court cited the actions of the individuals apprehended
leaving the scene and their refusal to identify the owner or
occupant or otherwise explain their actions (R. 80, 82). The
trial court also relied on a concern for officer safety because
of potential threats from unknown persons who may have still been
inside the apartment, and a need to stop what appeared be a
trespass or burglary that was taking place (R. 80).
Exigent circumstances have been clearly defined by the Utah
Court of Appeals as:
[T]hose "that would cause a reasonable person to believe
that entry... Was necessary to prevent physical harm to the
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant
evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law
enforcement efforts." United States v, McConney, 728 F.2d
1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
"The need for an immediate search must be apparent to the
police, and so strong as to outweigh the important
protection of individual rights provided by the warrant
requirement." U.S. v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 859 (9th
Cir. 1979).
Beavers, 859 P.2d at 17.
Under the applicable legal analysis, it is clear that none
of the circumstances of the instant case qualify as exigent
circumstances.

16

1„

An officer's
suspicion of drugs does not in and of
itself
create an exigency.

This Court considered the application of the exigent
circumstances doctrine to the suspected use of drugs in State v.
South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994), remanded on other grounds,
924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996).

In South, the officer responded to a

call of a suspected cellular phone theft.

He met the defendant

at the door and smelled burnt marijuana coming from his clothing
and from inside the home.

Id. at 797. The officer left to

secure a warrant to search the person of defendant and rfeturned
with other officers to the home to serve the warrant.

In

executing the search of the defendant, the officers also searched
the residence and discovered controlled substances and
paraphernalia.

Id.

At trial, the defendant sought suppression of the evidence,
arguing that the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by
searching his residence.

The trial court upheld the search,

ruling that although the search warrant was defective, the
officers had probable cause to conduct a search of the residence
based on the plain smell doctrine.

Id.

This Court reversed, holding that, although the plain smell
doctrine did supply the officer with probable cause, a finding of
both probable cause and exigent circumstances was required to
justify a warrantless search.

South, 885 P.2d at 799.

Further,

the Court rejected the argument presented by the State that the
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smell of burning marijuana automatically provided officers with
exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search.

"[A]

home will still be there when officers return with a search
warrant.

Further, officers can secure a home while a search

warrant is obtained...

Therefore, the fact that the marijuana

may be ^removed, hidden, or destroyed is not, in and of itself,
an exigent circumstance.'" South, 885 P.2d at 800 (quoting State
v. Dorson, 615 P.2d 740, 746 (Haw. 1980)).
The South Court responded appropriately to the State's
attempt to justify the search under the exigent circumstances
exception:
If we were to hold that the mere possibility that evidence
maybe destroyed constitutes an exigent circumstance, we
would essentially undermine the exigent circumstance
requirement since it is possible that most forms of evidence
can be destroyed before officers return with a warrant.
The

State's
concern that marijuana may be hidden or disposed
before officers
obtain a warrant is outweighed by the
concern that a warrantless search would violate
the
heightened expectation
of privacy in a private
home.

of

Id (emphasis added).
Similarly, in the present case the alleged presence of
marijuana should not be considered to be a per se exigent
circumstance.

Under the present facts, Knudsen and Halliday

really did not personally observe the odor of marijuana until he
opened the door to the apartment without consent (Supp. Hrg. at
9, 17, 28). A tip of suspected marijuana use, absent any
investigatory corroboration, ought not be considered to be an
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emergency situation which would require the application of the
exigent circumstances exception.

The Fourth Amendment would mean

nothing if law enforcement personnel were allowed to invade the
privacy of a home for nothing more.
Furthermore, as the South Court noted, a home cannot be
quickly and easily driven away, as can a vehicle—particularly
where as in this case enough officers are present to both control
the scene and secure a warrant.

The same risk of the loss of

evidence simply does not exist in this situation.

Therefore, the

policy behind the exigent circumstances exception does not
support a search of a residence under the instant facts, although
that policy might well permit a warrantless search if a vehicle
had been involved rather than a residence.

Moreover, a

telephonic warrant could have been sought in this case to perform
a search efficiently and constitutionally.

However, this

procedure was simply not completed.

2.

No threat of officer
safety created
could justify
the warrantless
entry
home.

a situation
which
into
Johnsonfs

The trial court concluded that officers were authorized to
enter Johnson's residence to conduct a safety sweep for officer
safety reasons (R. 80). Under direct examination, Officer
Knudsen testified that the walk-through of Johnson's apartment
was ordered out of concern for officer safety (Supp. Hrg. at 12).
In considering the issue of officer safety, the Beavers Court
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stated that:
Exigent circumstances which would justify a warrantless
entry ^are those in which a substantial
risk of harm to the
persons involved or to the law enforcement process would
arise if the police were to delay a search until a warrant
could be obtained...

There

must

be no practical

way

to

avoid these risks and yet follow the Constitution's mandate
of detached judicial supervision of such intrusions.'
Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (quoting United States v. Robertson, 606
F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
In its analysis, the Court went on to unequivocally state
that "[a]ny legitimate concern which police claim for their
safety must of necessity arise before
Moreover, police

cannot

warrantless entry."

create

the

the challenged entry...

exigency

in order to justify a

Id. (emphasis added).

In the present case, there was certainly no articulable
concern for officer safety preceeding the warrantless entry.
The pronounced rationale for performing the sweep was to check
for additional suspects after the first seven occupants fled
through the rear window.

However, it should be noted that this

scenario did not occur until after

the illegal entry of Knudsen

and Halliday by opening the door without consent.

Moreover, when

Knudsen and Halliday first entered the apartment they saw no one
and no weapons (Supp. Hrg. at 20, 31). Any arguable exigency at
the point of the suspect's flight was created solely by law
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enforcement.3

Prior to Officer Knutzen's entry, the facts known

to the officers were: drugs were allegedly being used on the
suspect premises, the renter was suspicioned to be at work, and
an unknown individual who may or may not have been in the
apartment smelled of marijuana (Supp. Hrg. at 7-9, 16-17, 22,
29).

These circumstances did not give rise to any fear for the

safety of the officers or the safety of any citizen bystander.
The efforts of law enforcement officers would not have been
endangered or frustrated by securing a warrant to effect lawful
entry into the home.
Furthermore, regardless of the cause of the initial
exigency, the officers in this case had controlled any initially
chaotic situation when they apprehended the seven individuals who
fled from the apartment.

The suspects were secured safely

outside the apartment and the officers had observed no furtive
movements or weapons of any kind (Supp. Hrg. at 11, 20, 24, 31).
Therefore any "initial exigencies" had dissipated by the time of
the warrantless "security sweep" and could not have justified the
warrantless search.

See Wells, 928 P.2d at 389. Again, the

officers could have easily secured the home, as it appears they
had, and secure the required warrant without violating Johnson's

3

Johnson has previously marshaled the evidence in the
Statement of Facts but will do so explicitly in the next section
as it relates to the issue of whether police created any
exigencies in this case.
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Fourth Amendment rights.

3.

Any emergency or risk
created

of flight

by the officer's

by the suspects

illegal

entry

into

was

the home.

The trial court's conclusion that the risk of flight of any
occupants remaining in the apartment justified the warrantless
entry and search of Johnson's home was clearly erroneous.

Law

enforcement officers cannot create the exigency upon which they
rely to qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement.

In

so holding the Beavers Court cited to United States v. MunozGuerra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1986).

The Fifth Circuit there

determined that the agents created their own exigency by
announcing their presence to the suspects.

For that reason, the

warrantless entry and search that followed was improper.

Id. at

297-98.
The analysis there is parallel to the facts of the instant
case.

Here, the trial court concluded that Officer Knudsen's

"[o]pening the door to the apartment, under the totality of the
facts, did not cause the people to flee out the back of the
apartment as evidenced by someone closing the door as the officer
approached followed by movement and rustling and the almost
simultaneous departure of 8 people out the back as the officer
was calling out in front (R. 82).
However, Halliday testified that an individual opened the
door when he and Knudsen knocked on the apartment door (Supp.
Hrg. at 24). Moreover, Johnson asserts that Knudsen's testimony
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(which is supported by Halliday's testimony on this point)
indicates that his entry and subsequent verbal identification was
the likely cause of the exigency—the fleeing of the apprehended
individuals.

Both officers testified that upon opening the door

and following Knudsen's identification, they were informed that
some individuals were running from the back of the building
(Supp. Hrg. at 10, 19-20, 30). This assertion is also supported
by Knudsen's testimony at preliminary hearing:
Q. Now, you also stated on direct that you knocked on the
door. The door was completely closed; is that correct?
A. It was initially open when I looked down there. Then
when I walked down the hallway it closed.
Q. But the door was closed when you —
A. When I got there it was closed, yeah.
Q. When you say you checked the door, how did you check it?
Did you rattle the handle or did you knock; what was it that
you did specifically?
A. I knocked for quite a while. I could hear some rustling
going around. Then I just twisted the door handle to see if
it was unlocked.
Q. So after you knocked you didn't hear anyone say, "Come
in," or anything like that, right?
A. (Inaudible).
Q. How far did you open the door?
A. I just pushed it open. It could have went a couple feet
open.
Q. And you stated upon direct that you smelled marijuana
after you pushed the door open; is that correct?
A. Yeah, immediately. Yes.
Q. And you didn't smell marijuana before the time you
opened the door, did you?
A. I smelled it on the other individual J.C. Thomas.
Q. But you didn't have any personal knowledge that he had
been in the apartment, did you?
A. I didn't.
Q. You indicate another officer informed you that some
people were running out of the window of the apartment; is
that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. You got on the radio, or how was it that you were
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informed of that?
A. I don't recall. It wasn't on the radio. I think
somebody had yelled around, "They're running out the back
window."
Q. That was after you had opened the door and identified
your presence; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
(Prelim. Tr. at 18-19).
It is clear—based on Knudsen's own testimony—that none of
the occupants within the apartment fled until after
had opened the door to the apartment.

the officers

Hence, similar to the

officers in United States v. Munoz-Guerra,(cited with approval in
Beavers) the need to pursue the suspects and search the home for
any hiding individuals arose solely from the officer's actions of
announcing their presence and the improper, premature entry into
the home.

The officers in this case had every opportunity prior

to the challenged entry to remain on guard outside

the dwelling

while they complied with the warrant requirement.

Indeed, the

officers did just that after the improper entry was made.

The

fact that the officers were later able to quickly secure a
warrant clearly demonstrates that this avenue was both reasonable
and available to them.

However, the officers chose instead to

enter Johnson's private home without a warrant and in violation
of the Constitution.

This type of "shoot from the hip" approach

is improper and ought not be sanctioned by this Court.
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4,

Suspicions of a possible burglary or trespass
in
progress did not create an exigent
circumstance.

Finally, the trial court justified the entry at issue by
concluding that the officer's suspicions of burglary and/or
trespass rose to the level of an exigent circumstance (R. 80-82).
The record in this case refers to the individual identified as
"J.C." outside the suspect residence and the time the officers
questioned the informants.

Officer Knudsen spoke with J.C.

Anderson briefly and determined that he did not reside in the
apartment (Supp. Hrg. at 8).

The officer also noted that J.C.

smelled of burnt marijuana (Supp. Hrg. at 17). However, Knudsen
later acknowledged that he had no real knowledge that Anderson
had ever been in the apartment nor did Knudsen inquire of
Anderson as to the apartment's owner (Supp. Hrg. at 16).
Therefore, at this stage in the scenario, any suspicions of
burglary or trespass were tenuous at best and solely based upon
the complainants assertion that they did not believe the owner
was present (Supp. Hrg. at 7, 22, 29).
Furthermore, based on the testimony presented by Officer
Knutzen at the Preliminary Hearing, it is clear that the •
suspicions maintained by law enforcement officers prior to the
warrantless entry were directed at the possible marijuana usage,
not at a suspected burglary.

It was not until after

the entry,

and the attempted flight by the suspects which was directly
caused by that entry, that any suspicions regarding a burglary or
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trespass were raised.4

The State ought not be permitted to rely

on knowledge that the officers obtained post-entry.

Johnson

respectfully submits that only the facts known to the officers at
the time of the challenged entry, when Knudsen opened the door
without consent and announced his presence and demand to speak
with someone, should be considered.

Testimony offered at the

Preliminary Hearing clearly demonstrates that, at the time of the
4

During Direct Examination regarding the initial contact
between law enforcement and the informants, the Officer responded
to the following questioning:
Q.
... I asked you about a burglary. Did the persons
outside tell you that the people in the apartment did not
live there, or what did they say about that?
A. They said they believed that the individual who they
believed lived there was at work, and didn't know any of the
people downstairs. The said— they brought up the initial
marijuana usage at that time. So I was just thinking it was
suspicious that these individuals were in the house at this
time.
Q. Did you suspect that the people inside the house were
not connected with the home?

A. I was unsure at the time.
going on downstairs.

Didn't

know exactly

what was

(R. 128, p. 6)(emphasis added).
In further Direct, Officer Knutzen described the pursuit and
detention of the suspects following the entry to the residence:
Q. After you caught those seven people did you determine if
any of them lived in the apartment?
A. I did. I brought them back to the residence, sat them
down on the sidewalk, and began to question them as to who
lived in the apartment.
Q. Did any of them live there?
A. They stated, "No." When I asked them who lived in the
apartment and asked for any names, they all motioned with
their bodies that they didn't know.
Q. What did you do next?

A.

I was concerned

about a possible

burglary

at that

because nobody was claiming they knew who lived in the
apartment.
(R. 128, p. 9)(emphasis added).
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time,

entry, the officer suspected possible marijuana usage, not a
possible burglary.

The suspicion of burglary and/or trespass did

not arise until after

the warrantless entry gave rise to the foot

pursuit, and the subsequent detention and questioning of the
suspects.
Moreover, even if the officers in this case did suspect a
burglary before the first warantless entry, the search would
still not be justified.

Recall that in Beavers the officers had

in their possession all of the following information: the tip
from the manager of a crime (assualt) in progress, the
information that the manager did not believe that the Caucasian
renter of the suspect apartment was home and the later
confirmation that all occupants were in fact African American,
the fact that the latch to the apartment door was broken from a
possible forced entry, the knowledge that a burglary and theft
involving coats had been committed earlier that day, the argument
the officers overheard regarding the value of coats, and the
fears the officers had regarding their own safety.

All of this

was insufficient to justify the warrantless entry that occurred.
In this case, contrary to Beavers, there was no broken latch
or any signs of forced entry or any explicit suggestion of a
burglary in progress.

Unlike the officers in Beavers who had

definite reason for knowing that the individuals in the apartment
were not the owners or residents, in this case there was only the
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potential that there may have been someone remaining in the
apartment who did not reside there.

Clearly, if the

circumstances in Beavers was insufficient to justify a
warrantless entry, then the circumstances surrounding the entry
into Johnson's residence require the same conclusion- that the
warrantless entry and subsequent search was not justified by
exigent circumstances.
B.

The Utah Constitution provides additional protections
against warrantless searches above the threshold provided by
the United States Constitution.
Although the language of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah

Constitution mirrors its federal counterpart, in application its
effect may be markedly different.

The Utah Supreme Court so

noted in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).

Citing its

own language from and earlier decision, the Larocco Court held
that "^choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for
insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the
federal courts. 7 " Id. at 465 (quoting State v. Watts, 750 P.2d
1219, 1221 at n. 8 (Utah 1988)).
Using that rationale, the Utah Supreme Court elected to set
a higher state standard for applying the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement contained within the State Constitution.
Defendant submits that the federal courts' interpretation of the
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exigent circumstances exception, much like the interpretation of
the automobile exception, has the potential to vacillate and not
provide the consistent protection necessary.

The citizens of

Utah should be protected from arbitrary actions of law
enforcement that are evidenced by the facts of this case.
Accordingly, the present search should be overturned under both
the federal and the state constitutions.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Johnson respectfully asks that this Court conclude that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in
concluding that the warrantless entry and subsequent search of
his residence were justified under an "exigent circumstances"
theory.

Accordingly, Johnson asks that this Court reverse his

conviction and remand the matter to the district court with
directions that Johnson's plea may be withdrawn and with orders
to suppress the illegally obtained evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

irJ^K

day of September, 1998.

•7),,

I'^A

Margaret P. Lindsa
Counsel for Johnscfh
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KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

STUART EARL JOHNSENf
Defendant(s).

:

Case No. 961401667 FS

s

Judge Guy R. Burningham

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham
presiding, on the 1st day of July, 1997. The Plaintiff was represented
by Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor.

The Defendant was

present, in person, and represented by Christine Sagendorf.
heard evidence on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

The Court

Being advised in

the premises, the Court makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 16, 1997 police officers were dispatched to 980

North 646 West in Provo because a neighbor was complaining about
marijuana being used in an adjoining apartment.
2.

Officers arrived, just before midnight, and spoke on the street

outside the apartment to two men, Troy Guevara and Jason Campbell, who

stated that they lived upstairs from the complained-of apartment and
could smell the odor of burned or burning marijuana coming from the
apartment. The men told officers that they didn't believe the renter or
owner of the apartment was present but was at work and that they didn! t
know or recognize any of the people in the apartment.

They pointed to

a third person and told officers that "he's one of them".
3.

Officers spoke to the third man, J.C. Thomas Asderson.

The

officer who spoke to Anderson, Officer Knutzen, could detect an odor of
marijuana coming from Anderson.

Anderson said he didn't live in the

apartment and was just visiting.
4.

Officer Knutzen, at that point, reasonably suspected that a

burglary or trespass might be taking place.
5.

The officers then approached the suspect apartment which was

the basement or downstairs apartment.

As the officers started at the

top of the stairs to go down to the door they noticed that the front
door to the apartment was open one to two feet. As they walked down the
stairs, someone from inside shut the door,
6.

Officer Knutzen knocked several times on the door.

As he

knocked and waited, he heard a great deal of rustling and movement
inside the apartment.

At this point the officer had a heightened

suspicion of criminal activity within the apartment.

The officer

checked the front door to see if it was locked and discovered that it
was not locked.

He then pushed the door open to approximately the same

as it had been when he started down the stairs. The room was dark and
nothing was seen or heard by the officer when the door was opened.

The
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officer called out that he was a police officer and wished to speak to
someone. When the door was opened the officer caught a strong smell of
burned marijuana.

The officers were, at that point, told that people

were climbing out of the back window of the apartment and fleeing the
scene.
7.

Several officers participated for about 10 to 15 minutes

chasing and apprehending 7 to 8 people who had climbed „out the back
window and fled the scene.

All were brought back and asked if they

lived in the apartment or knew who did.

All replied that they did not

live there and none could identify the owner or tenant.
8.

Opening the door to the apartment, under the totality of the

facts, did not cause the people to flee out the back of the apartment as
evidenced by someone closing the door as the officer approached followed
by movement and rustling and the almost simultaneous departure of 8
people out the back as the officer was calling out in front.
9.

Before conducting a protective sweep of the apartment, officers

had determined,

(1) that the neighbors had detected the odor of

marijuana and knew the tenant to not be home; (2) that a person
identified by the neighbors as one of the people who had been in the
apartment did smell of burned marijuana; (3) that someone had closed the
door of the apartment as the officers approached on the stairs to speak
with the people in the apartment; (4) that an odor of marijuana was
emanating from the apartment's door when it was opened by the officer;
(5) that at least 7 people fled out the back window as officers were
attempting to speak with them at the front door; and, (6) that the 7
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people who fled, when caught and brought back to the scene did not live
in the apartment and
10.

could not identify who the tenant was.

Out of concern for officer safety for fear that an additional

person or persons might still be inside the apartment and also because
the officers felt that any additional persons inside the apartment did
not belong there and were committing a trespass or burglary, two
officers walked through the apartment to check for additional suspects
as a "security sweep".
11.

During the sweep officers found the defendant hiding in a

locked bathroom.

Officers also saw drug paraphernalia which was not

seized but merely described in an affidavit in support of a search
warrant which was obtained and executed, resulting in the seizure of the
evidence sought to be suppressed by this motion.
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the
following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Officers had a reasonable suspicion that the crimes of

trespass, burglary and/or use of controlled substances were being
committed

in

the

apartment

after

hearing

the

statements

of

the

complaining citizens and speaking to the third man identified as one of
the group in the apartment.
2. Officers had probable cause to believe that criminal conduct was
occurring within the apartment and that important evidence would be
found in the apartment upon considering the statements of the neighbors,
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the encounter with the man identified as "one of them", observing the
door to the apartment close as the officers descended the stairs,
observing the sound of movement and rustling inside the apartment before
knocking on the door.
3. The occupants1 flight from a rear window of the apartment as
officers were attempting to make contact at the front door was virtually
simultaneous with the actions of the door opening an£l calling to
occupants by the officer.

The flight was not caused by the officer's

actions.
4. The actions of the occupants, however, in fleeing the scene and
then refusing to identify the owner or occupant or otherwise explain
their actions provided exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless
entry into the home to determine if any crime was ongoing.
5.

The security sweep of the apartment after apprehending the

people who fled from the apartment was justified by the probable cause
that a crime had been or was occurring within the apartment coupled with
exigent circumstances consisting of a legitimate concern for officer
safety because of a potential threat from unknown persons who may have
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still been inside the apartment and the need to stop what appeared to be
a trespass or burglary that was taking place.
DATED this

I(

day of August, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

GU? R. /BURNlNGl
DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

CHRISTIN:
ATTORNEY

SENDORF
JDEFENDANT
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